Regulating Human Gene Therapy by Areen, Judith C.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1985 
Regulating Human Gene Therapy 
Judith C. Areen 
Georgetown University Law Center, areen@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1437 
 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
West Virginia Law Review
Volume 88 Fall 1985 Number 2
REGULATING HUMAN GENE THERAPYt
JUDITH AREEN*
I. SETTING THE STAGE
The question became whether A-T and G-C base pairs would easily fit the
backbone configuration devised during the previous two weeks. At first glance this
looked like a good bet, since I had left free in the center a large vacant area for
the bases. However we both knew that we would not be home until a complete
model was built in which all the stereochemical contacts were satisfactory. There
was also the obvious fact that the implications of its existence were far too impor-
tant to risk crying wolf. Thus I felt slightly queasy when at lunch Francis winged
into the Eagle [a pub near the laboratory], to tell everyone within hearing distance
that we had found the secret of life.'
The "Francis" in question is Francis Crick, then a young scientist who had
not yet even earned his Ph.D. The author of the excerpt is James Watson, then
twenty-four. It is England, 1953, and Watson and Crick have just uncovered the
structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)-thus inaugurating a new era in the history
of science.
Watson's boastful account of the events surrounding their achievement, The
Double Helix, combines the excitement of a good mystery with enough competi-
tion to warm the heart of the most ardent capitalist. There is Linus Pauling, within
weeks or days of making the discovery himself, in hot pursuit of the answer-and
the Nobel Prize it would eventually bring to Watson and Crick for getting there
first. But was the excitement justified? It is true that the structure that Watson
and Crick had just decoded was related to life itself-but only to its physical struc-
ture. The larger meaning of life, however-or of their discovery-was not to be
uncovered so easily.
f This Article is based on an address delivered at the 1985 Benedum Centennial Lecture, West
Virginia University College of Law.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor of Com-
munity and Family Medicine, Georgetown University Medical Center; member of the Working Group
on Human Gene Therapy of the National Institutes of Health. I was assisted in preparing this article
by a helpful suggestion made by W. French Anderson, Richard Cooper, and Leroy Walters and by
the research of Jan Montgomery and Nadine Samter.
' J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX 197 (1968).
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Sir Isaac Newton once observed: If I have seen further it is by standing on
the shoulders of giants. 2 The work. of Watson and Crick similarly rested on the
earlier achievements of many others. The path that led to the code for DNA began
at least as far back as the mid-nineteenth century in the garden of Gregor Mendel,
an obscure monk in Austria whose breeding experiments with sweet pea plants led
him to postulate the existence of genes. In 1868, just three years after Mendel
published his findings, Frederick Miescher identified DNA, which he termed
"nuclein." 4 The function of DNA was not really understood until after almost
a century of work, 5 capped by the report of Watson and Crick, which revealed
the structure of DNA, thereby demonstrating how information could be transformed
between generations. 6
Each cell in the human body has a nucleus, where genetic material is stored.
In essence, this material acts as a blueprint guiding the cell to perform its appropriate
function. Each cell normally contains twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, for a
total of forty-six, with half of each pair inherited from one parent. 7 Watson and
Crick determined that each chromosome is a double helix of DNA. Particular
segments of the DNA strands are more commonly termed genes.8 Each cell con-
tains all the genetic blue-prints for the whole person. It is able to perform its
specialized functions because only a portion of the genetic material (5-10%) is active
at any one time-telling it to be a liver cell or a muscle cell, etc.9
The pace of scientific development in this field has moved with ever increasing
I Letter to Robert Hooke, Feb. 5, 1675-76. For a delightful romp through the alleged historic
origins of the phrase see G. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965).
Metalogicon bk. III, ch. iv (1159).
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED
GENETICS 30 (1981) [hereinafter cited as OTA APPLIED GENETICS].
M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD 22 (1977).
In 1944, Avery, McLeod, and McCarty, researchers at Rockefeller Institute, demonstrated
bacterial transformation. They found that mixing DNA from a deadly strain or pneumonia bacteria
that was itself dead with a live but harmless form of bacteria was lethal when injected in rats. Resistance
continued, however to the suggestion that DNA was the source of heredity. See M. ROGERS, supra
note 4, at 36.
In 1952, Alfred Hershey and Martha Chase performed a "blender experiment" at Cold Spring
Harbor, Long Island, in which they marked phages [masses of DNA encased in a shell] with radioactive
isotopes, allowed them to infect bacteria, then spun the mixture in a blender. They found that the
DNA of the phage was securely inside the bacteria, with only its protein case left behind. M. ROGERS,
supra note 4, at 37.
6 OTA APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 3, at 34. In what has been termed "one of the most coy
statements in the literature of science," Watson and Crick concluded their paper on their discovery,
which was published in Nature, April, 1953, by saying, "It has not escaped our notice that the specific
pairing we have postulated suggests a possible copying mechanism for genetic material." M. ROGERS,
supra note 4, at 38.
7 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE 26 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SPLICING LIFE]. Sex-cells (sperm
and ova) or germ-line cells, as they are termed, normally contain only twenty-three chromosomes.
OTA APPLIED GENETICS, supra note 3, at ix.
SPLICING LIFE, supra note 7, at 29.
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speed. It was almost a century from Mendel to Watson and Crick, but only seven-
teen years passed until the next scientific breakthrough-the discovery in 1970 of
the first DNA-cleaving enzyme, termed a "restriction" enzyme.'" These enzymes,
extracted from bacteria, cut a DNA molecule at specific sequences that occur here
and there along the double helix. Thus they enable scientists to reduce a very long
DNA molecule into a set of discrete fragments that can be recombined with each
other or joined with DNA from another organism to make a hybrid molecule."
II. ACT 1: SAFETY ISSUES
In 1971, only one year after the discovery of restriction enzymes, Paul Berg
announced plans to join DNA from the SV40 human virus with another virus,
and to insert this recombined DNA (rDNA) into E. coli bacteria.' 2 Cancer researcher
Robert Pollack, on hearing of the Berg proposal, reported:
I had a fit. SV40 is a small animal tumor virus; in tissue cultures in the lab,
SV40 also transforms individual human cells, making them look very like tumor
cells .... And E. coli just naturally lives in people. [Those involved] seemed to
see it as a neat academic exercise. And I said, of all stupid things, at least put
it into a phage [virus] then, that doesn't grow in a bug that grows in your gut.
Because what if the combination escapes from the lab; then you have [the human
virus] replicating in step with the E. coli and a constant exposure of the cells in
your gut to the DNA of SV40. Which is a route in for the virus that never occurs
in nature.., and therefore something you might not be prepared to fend off.'"
Pollack called Paul Berg, who soon learned that his Stanford colleagues were
also uneasy about the risks of rDNA. Discussion of the risks spread. At the same
time, work with restriction enzymes made it possible for anyone with "a moderate
level of microbiologic skill [to] perform potentially hazardous genetic manipula-
tions that two years earlier had not even been imaginable.""' By January, 1973,
one hundred researchers met at the Asilomar Conference Center on California's
Monterey peninsula to discuss the risks. By June, 1973, at the Gordon Conference
in New Hampshire, a majority of those present voted to send a letter to Phillip
Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences. The letter, published in
,0 Id. at 32.
" Weinberg, The Molecules of Life, 253 Sci. AM. 48, 50, 52 (1985).
12 Swazy, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the
Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Risks and Benefits].
At the time, genetic work has focused only on the simple bacterium Eschericola coli or E. coli,
which can be "infected" with foreign DNA using a bacteriophage or "phage." But once the focus
moves to more complex mechanisms, a bacteriophage will not work to carry the DNA to the cell.
Berg turned to SV40 because he believed that a tumor virus could be used to bring DNA into a mammalian
cell. M. ROGERS, supra note 4, at 43.
"1 Risks and Benefits, supra note 12, at 1021.
" M. ROGERS, supra note 4, at 52.
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Science in 1973, expressed concern about the risks of creating hybrid DNA
molecules.Is In April 1974, ten individuals, including Paul Berg and James Watson,
met at MIT and decided to ask for a temporary moratorium on further research. 6
Their letter, also published in Science, stated in part:
Some of the rDNA molecules could prove hazardous. [We propose] that until
the potential hazards of such recombinant DNA molecules are better evaluated,
or until adequate methods are developed for preventing their spread, scientists
throughout the world join with members of this committee in voluntarily deferring
[experiments that pose such risks]."
Think of it: the scientists were concerned enough about the possible risks to
ask for a self-imposed moratorium-an act without precedent in the history of
science.
III. ACT 2: INTRAGOVERNMENTAL BATTLES-THE FIGHT TO REGULATE
Congress immediately set about holding hearings, although no legislation
emerged.' 8 The executive branch, by contrast, moved fairly quickly to regulate.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1974, building on the discussions begun
in the scientific community, established a Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
(RAC). The RAC, chaired by NIH's deputy director for science, initially was made
up entirely of scientists; it functioned more as a "kitchen cabinet" for NIH Direc-
tor Donald S. Frederickson then as a group of outside advisors. 9
In 1975 a second Asilomar conference was held. One very important product
of Asilomar II was the suggestion of participants that a new safety measure could
and should be employed for some rDNA work. In their view, safety could be assured
for some rDNA experiementation by using not only physical containment, a safety
measure already widely used in microbiology laboratories, but also "biological con-
tainment" by which they meant limiting either the infectivity of the vector (the
I Singer & Soil, Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules, 181 Sci. 1114 (1973) (letter).
16 J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG &A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE 15 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as J. AREEN].
185 ScI. 303 (1974) (letter).
" For a discussion of legislation passed in 1985 over a veto by President Reagan, see text at
note 90 infra.
'1 J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 46. The membership of RAC was enlarged and broadened in
1978 by HEW Secretary Califano. Mr. Califano later reported:
[W]e sparked [the scientists'] spirited resistance when we added a number of ethicists, clergy,
lawyers and lay persons to the committee. Fredrickson, however, saw the move as enriching
the advisory group and strengthening a potential consensus on DNA research. Eventually
many of the scientists who originally opposed the action appreciated some of the benefits
of broad public participation.
CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S REPORT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CABINET 203
(1981).
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agent that transfers a piece of DNA from one host to another), or limiting its
dissemination and survival in the environment. The idea of biological containment
was soon to be adopted by the RAC.20
At about the same time, new research suggesting that DNA recombinants
occurred more frequently in nature than had previously been recognized put to
rest some of the early fears of opening a genetic Pandora's box. 2' The influence
of these new developments was reflected in 1976 when Dr. Frederickson, with the
advice and counsel of the RAC, issued "Guidelines for Research Involving Recom-
binant DNA Molecules." ' 22 These regulations ran to thirty-two triple-column printed
pages in the Federal Register. Revised periodically since, most recently in 1984,
the guidelines establish the RAC of NIH as the primary point of regulatory over-
sight in the federal government. Although in theory the guidelines apply only to
rDNA research that is conducted or sponsored by an institution that receives sup-
port for such research from NIH, in practice most private research protocols have
been submitted to the RAC for 'clearance.23
The first judicial test of these new guidelines was also the first time the third
branch of government looked at rDNA. In Mack v. Califano,24 a resident of
Frederick, Maryland, sought a temporary restraining order to stop any rDNA
experiments from being conducted at nearby Ft. Detrick. The district court denied
the request, noting that the defendants were in full compliance with the NIH
guidelines. The court added:
In the planned experiment a derivative of E. coli K-12, which has been specifically
designed to "self-destruct," will be employed. E. coli K-12 is unable to colonize
10 Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976),
(revised 49 Fed. Reg. 46,266 (1984)) [hereinafter cited as rDNA Regulations].
2, RISKS AND BENEFITs, supra note 12, at 1070.
22 rDNA Regulations, supra note 20.
" A notable exception is the proposal by Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. to field test genetically
modified bacteria intended to protect crops against I ost damage. The experiment was recommended
for approval by the RAC in June, 1984, but the dir.cmor of NIH withheld his approval to avoid apply-
ing different standards to private companies as opposed to academic researchers. (A previous injunc-
tion prevented NIH from approving an almost identical experiment proposed by Stephen Landow at
the University of California. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.) Advanced Genetic Sciences
therefore withdrew its application for the RAC and submitted it to EPA. 316 NATURE 183 (1985). On
November 15, 1985, EPA approved the experiment against the advice of Martin Alexander of Cornell
University, the chairman of EPA's own Scientific advisory panel Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1985 at A2, col. 5.
In the absence of federal legislation, New York and a number of locations have passed legislation
making the NIH guidelines mandatory. These localities are Amherst, Massachusetts; Berkeley,
California; Boston, Massachusetts; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Emeryville, California; Newton,
Massachusetts; Princeton, New Jersey; Somerville, Massachusetts; and Waltham, Massachusetts.
Hearings on The Potential Environmental Consequences of Genetic Engineering, Subcommittee on the
Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 40 (Sept. 25, 1984) (statement by Bernard Talbot, Acting Director, Na-
tional Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health).
' Mack v. Califano, 447 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1978).
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in the human intestinal tract and causes no known human or animal disease. This
K-12 host-vector system will not survive passage through the intestinal tract of
animals and will "die" because of its dependency on chemicals not found in nature.
Defendants further point out that the complete experiment will be conducted
in P4 physical containment laboratories which have been shown to contain microbes
presenting a known and demonstrable hazard to man."
Biological as well as physical containment was now recognized in case law.
At the same time, the court's decision implicitly gave strong support to the power
of the RAC by demonstrating that compliance with the NIH guidelines would help
to protect future rDNA experiments from legal challenge.
Seven years later, in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler,"6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was also asked to
stop an rDNA experiment, this time an experiment involving the deliberate release
of genetically engineered organisms into the air. The experiment in question, to
be conducted by Drs. Nicholas Panopoulos and Steven Lindow, two scientists at
the University of California, Berkeley, was designed to test the possibility of
increasing the frost resistance of certain crops by applying genetically altered
bacteria. 7 The RAC had approved the experiment in question without objection."
The minutes of the RAC meeting revealed only one sentence on the issue of disper-
sion, however, and that came almost verbatim from the proposal:
Although some movement of bacteria toward sites near treatment locations
by insect or aerial transport is possible, the numbers of viable cells transported
has been shown to be very small; and these cells are subject to biological and physical
processes limiting survival. "9
The court observed, "Remarkably ... RAC completely failed to consider the
possible environmental impact from dispersion of genetically altered bacteria,
however small the number and however subject to procedures limiting survival." 30
The court therefore halted the experiment until an adequate environmental assess-
ment was completed.
Factual differences in the two cases may explain the difference in outcome.
Deliberate release clearly raises safety issues different from those presented by
experimentation that is intended to be confined to a laboratory setting. In Mack,
moreover, unlike Foundation on Economic Trends, an environmental impact state-
" Id. at 669.
26 Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A federal district
court had enjoined the experiments on May 18, 1984 at the request of the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeals was viewing that decision.
Id. at 152.
, Id. at 153. This vote occurred after the proposal was modified and resubmitted. At an earlier
meeting, the RAC vote was seven in favor, five opposed and two abstentions. Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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ment was completed prior to the court's decision. Nonetheless, the strong impres-
sion remains that the willingness of the judiciary to defer to the expertise of the
RAC had somewhat diminished, at least in the absence of evidence that relevant
risk factors were fully considered by the RAC.
IV. ACT 3: HuMAN SUBJECTS
Scientific developments once again have moved the public debate on genetic
engineering to a new issue. The concern now is human gene therapy. Within the
next year or so, it is probable that protocols will be submitted to NIH to test the
use of genetic engineering techniques to treat patients suffering from genetic defects.3"
It is also likely that the subjects of this first use of genetic engineering in humans
will be children; in this instance, children suffering from presently incurable condi-
tions caused by a deficiency in a single gene. The most likely gene to be used in
the first experiments on human gene therapy is adenosine deaminase (ADA), the
absence of which results in severe combined immunodeficiency disease in which
children have a greatly weakened resistance to infection and cannot survive the
usual childhood diseases.3"
A. HHS Regulations
The shift in scientific focus means that a separate set of federal regulatory
standards are relevant-the regulations of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) that protect human subjects of research conducted
in any institution receiving HHS funds.3 3 Again, a brief review of the pertinent
history is in order both to understand why this separate set of regulations came
into being in the first place and to understand why they are now relevant.
1. Historical Foundations
For the most part, the federal government does not attempt to regulate the
relationship between a physician and his or her patient. Requirements are imposed
on drugs and medical devices before they can be marketed,34 but as if to underscore
" See Anderson, Prospects for Human Gene Therapy, 226 SCIENcE 401 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Anderson].
" Interview with W. French Anderson, September 23, 1985. Other possible genes to be used in
the first experiments are: hypoxanthine-guanine phosphoribosyl transferase (HPRT), the absence of
which results in Lesch-Nyhan disease (a severe neurological disorder that includes uncontrolled self-
mutilation); and purine nucleoside phosphorylase (PNP), the absence of which results in another form
of severe immunodeficiency disease. Anderson, Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considera-
tions, 10 J. MED. & PmL. 276 (1985).
" 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1983).
', See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314 (1985).
1985]
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the traditional deference shown to the medical profession, once the Food and Drug
Administration has approved a drug for one purpose, federal law does not prohibit
a licensed physician from prescribing that drug for another purpose."
The deference shown to the medical profession is in part a reflection of prin-
ciples of federalism: licensure and discipline of physicians are by tradition a matter
of state rather than federal responsibility. But even at the state level, relatively
little intrusion on the doctor-patient relationship occurs.
How, then, can one explain the federal regulations designed to protect patients
or other human beings who are the subject of medical experimentation? The answer
lies in large part in the revelations at Nuremburg about the activities of the Third
Reich. In United States v. Karl Brandt,3 also known as "The Medical Case," twenty
physicians, including Karl Brandt, Hitler's personal physician, were tried for crimes
that the defendants claimed were committed in the name of medical or scientific
research. The court, composed of three judges from the United States, determined
that:
In every single instance appearing in the record, subjects were used who did
not consent to the experiments, indeed, as to some of the experiments, it is not
even contended by the defendants that the subjects occupied the status of volunteers.
In no case was the experimental subject at liberty of his own free choice to withdraw
from any experiment. In many cases experiments were performed by unqualified
persons, were conducted at random for no adequate scientific reason, and under
revolting physical conditions. All of the experiments were conducted with unnecessary
suffering and injury and but very little, if any precautions were taken to protect
or safeguard the human subjects from the possibility of injury, disability, or death."
Indeed, the revelations of Nuremberg were so shocking, the conduct revealed
so inhumane, that one is tempted to dismiss them as an aberration best buried
in the past. But other, more recent examples of documented abuses in medical
experimentation make it impossible to dismiss Nuremberg so easily. Two in par-
ticular stand out. First, in 1966, Dr. Henry Beecher, the Henry Isaiah Dorr Pro-
fessor of Research at Harvard University, published a study in the New England
Journal of Medicine, in which he documented study after study that had been
published in professional journals and that violated the very principles of ethical
research enunciated at Nuremberg.2
For instance, consider example eighteen in Beecher's study:
Melanoma [a cancerous tumor] was transplanted from a daughter to her
volunteering and informed mother, "in the hope of gaining a little better understand-
ing of cancer immunity and in the hope that the production of tumor antibodies
3$ 21 C.F.R. § 1306.03 (1985).
"' Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law
No. 10 (1949), reprinted in part in J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 907.
j. AREEN, supra note 16, at 926.
" Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 N. ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
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might be helpful in the treatment of the cancer patient." Since the daughter died
on the day after the transplantation of the tumor into her mother, the hope expressed
seems to have been more theoretical than practical, and the daughter's condition
was described as "terminal" at the time the mother volunteered to be a recipient.
The primary implant was widely excised on the twenty-fourth day after it had been
placed in the mother. She died from metatastic melanoma on the four hundred
and fifty-first day after transplantation. The evidence that this patient died of dif-
fuse melanoma that metastasized from a small piece of transplanted tumor was
considered conclusive. 9
Second, in 1972, the national press broke the story of an experiment first begun
by the United States Public Health Service in Tuskeegee, Alabama, in 1932, to
determine the natural course of untreated syphilis."' The subjects were 400 poor,
black men who were never informed that they were subjects in an experiment-or
even that they had syphilis. The "experiment" continued long after effective treat-
ment was available. Indeed, the Public Health Service warned the Alabama Health
Department not to treat the test subjects when they took a mobile VD unit into
Tuskeegee in the early 1940s.4 1 As late as 1969, officials of the Centers for Disease
Control decided to let the "experiment" continue still further.4 2 It stopped only
when the headlines appeared.
Nuremberg could no longer be classed as a single aberration. The fact that
the victims of Tuskeegee were members of a minority group only strengthened the
parallel. The time had come to establish national standards for protecting human
subjects of research. As with rDNA, when Congress failed to act, the task of design-
ing the standards fell by default to the executive branch.
4 3
2. Role of IRB's
HHS, an executive agency, was responsible for developing regulations dealing
with such matters. The heart of the HHS regulations is a new entity: the Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB). The regulations provide that each IRB must have at
least five members, who represent more than one profession and both genders.4 4
One is to be a lawyer, ethicist, or member of the clergy, and at least one must
come from outside the institution sponsoring the research.43 Each institution is free
to establish its own IRB so long as the listed constraints are honored.
Id. at 1356.
, See generally, J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 937-50; J. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT (1981).
" Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskeegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 21 (1978).
42 Id.
"' There is some indication that NIH may have acted to pre-empt Congressional legislation. See
J. AREEN, supra 16, at 959.
" 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (1983).
" Id.
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Although the selection process may at first smack of the fox guarding the chicken
coop, my own experience as a member of an IRB has dispelled most of my initial
skepticism. The very process of presenting a proposal protocol for research involv-
ing human subjects to a committee assembled for the sole purpose of avoiding
undue risk or harm to those subjects has done more to raise the consciousness
of both researchers and IRB members about these issues than I would have
anticipated. An unexpected benefit I have also observed is that the scientific qual-
ity of some protocols has been improved through the same process of presentation,
explanation, and discussion with a group involving other experienced scientists and
physicians."
3. Problems in Application of HHS Regulations
The HHS regulations formally direct the IRB to approve protocols only if "risks
to subjects are minimized ... by using procedures which are consistent with sound
research design and which do not unnecessarily expose the subject to risk" and
if "risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to
subjects."" 7 Unfortunately, no guidance is given on how to apply these principles
to experiments on the frontiers of science such as human gene therapy.
The difficulty of deciding whether to approve a proposed experiment involving
human subjects is compounded when the proposed subjects are children. Reflect-
ing the traditional concern our society has felt for children, separate regulations
have been issued to govern such research."8 In addition to meeting the requirements
imposed on research involving adult human subjects, these separate regulations
specify that no more than minimal risk may be imposed on child-subjects unless
the research "holds out the prospect of direct benefit to the individual subjects." 9
" See generally Nat'l Comm'n for the Protection of Human Subjects, Institutional Review Boards:
Report and Recommendations (1978).
45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1) & (a)(2) (1983).
,' 48 Fed. Reg. 9814 (1983).
,9 45 C.F.R. § 46.405. There are two other sections of the regulations that may be relevant. Sec-
tion 46.406 addresses research involving "greater than minimal risk," but only if the risk represents
a "minor" increase over minimal risk. The section permits such research if it is "likely to yield generally
able knowledge about the subject's disorder or condition." Section 46.407 applies to research not covered
by other sections. Thus, it would apply to research involving greater than minimal risk where the risk
may not be justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects. Research covered by section 46.407
can proceed only if:
(a) The IRB finds that the research presents a reasonable opportunity to further the under-
standing, prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of
children; and
(b) The Secretary, after consultation with a panel of experts in pertinent disciplines (for example:
science, medicine, education, ethics, law) [determines]
(1) The research presents a reasonable opportunity to further the understanding,
prevention, or alleviation of a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of children....
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Unfortunately, the regulations do not clarify how likely the prospect of direct benefit
must be to meet the standard.
Consider the children presently suffering from severe combined immunodefi-
ciency disease (SCID). One of the best known victims was David, the boy who
lived for twelve years in a germ-free bubble at the Baylor College of Medicine in
Houston. Because of the disease, David's immune system failed to develop, leaving
him vulnerable to common and normally harmless bacteria or viruses." The cur-
rent treatment for the disease is a bone marrow transplant, but there are not enough
compatible, bone marrow donors.'
Should we proceed to experiment with the use of genetic engineering techniques
to treat these children? The answer will turn in large part on whether the experimental
procedure appears likely to be both safer than and at least as effective as the best
available conventional treatment, which in the case of SCID would be a bone mar-
row transplant. To try an experimental procedure that was less effective or just
as effective but less safe than available therapies would be clearly unjustified.
The first protocols to be submitted for approval concerning SCID will prob-
ably propose treating the subjects by altering the genetic structure of their bone
marrow cells to enable them to produce the missing enzyme.52 The protocols will
likely propose removing some of the subject's own bone marrow, delivering the
missing genetic material to the bone marrow cells by "infecting" them with a
retrovirus" to which the missing DNA segment has been added, and then reimplant-
ing the treated bone marrow in the subject. 4 Such a treatment proposal, while
designed to minimize the risk to the subjects that would arise if all the cells in
their bodies were infected with rDNA, does not eliminate the possibility of inadver-
tantly producing cancer. Viruses deposit the transplanted gene randomly in the cell's
chromosomes. If it lands in a control region for one of the approximately twenty
oncogenes-genes that can turn a normal cell into a cancer cell-a tumor could
result."
Another possible risk of this procedure is that the altered genetic material might
in some way be transmitted to third parties. One way of understanding the possible
dangers of using a retrovirus to transfer the genetic material is to consider AIDS
(acquired immune deficiency syndrome). AIDS is also caused by a retrovirus, one
11 Thompson, Researchers Ready to Try Gene Therapy, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1984, at D7, col.
3. See also text at note 32 supra. See generally E. Gelfand & H. Dosch, Diagnosis and Classification
of Severe combine Immuniodeficiency Disease, 19 BRITISH DFECTS 65 (1983).
" Id.
" Anderson, supra note 31, at 401-02.
" A retrovirus, unlike almost every other organism such as viruses, bacteria, plants, animals,
and humans, stores its genetic information in ribonucleic acid (RNA) rather than in its DNA. Thomp-
son, Like No Other Human Disease, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1985, at Health 10, col. 1.
" Anderson, supra note 31, at 401-02.
" Thompson, supra note 53.
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called human T-cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV-3). The AIDS virus can be trans-
mitted from one person to another in some circumstances, particularly via blood
transfusions or sexual contact.5 6 Similarly, a subject infected with a retrovirus might
be able to transmit the virus to others who might then suffer any adverse effects
associated with the retrovirus.
One of the most difficult aspects of assessing the immediate risks and benefits
of a human gene therapy protocol for the reviewing committees is likely to be
deciding whether there are sufficient animal data to justify proceeding with human
clinical trials. A very controversial part of this assessment will be weighing whether
or not it is necessary to conduct studies in primates, or at least in large animals,
which could delay human trials for several years. 7 On this issue, at least, scientists
are likely to be able to present data based on other situations in which the issue
was the appropriateness of moving from animal to human trials. On the issue of
longer term risks, by contrast, it will be harder to find appropriate analogies.
The first experiments that deliberately expose humans to rDNA arguably pose
two longer term risks. First there is the risk of damage to the future of offspring
of treated patients. The protocols described above are intended to involve only
somatic cells,5" or body cells, and thus should not affect future offspring of the
patients. But there remains the risk of unintended consequences. There is also little
doubt that the information gained by conducting such experiments may increase
" See generally Curran, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS:
Current Stakes and Future Prospects, 229 SCIENCE 1352 (1985):
The first cases of AIDS were reported in mid-1981 .... By 30 August 1985, 12,932 cases
of AIDS had been reported to the Centers for Disease Control ..... Over 6,480 (50 percent)
persons were known to have died.
... In most cases of AIDS in the United States, the virus appears to have been transmitted
through one of four routes: sexual contact, intravenous drug administration with contaminated
needles, administration of blood and blood products, and passage of the virus from infected
mothers to their newborns.
... A recent report, however, describes a nurse in England who developed confirmed HTVL-
III/LAV [the retrovirus that causes AIDS] antibody following a needlestick injury and exposure
to the blood of an AIDS patient.
" W. French Anderson has argued: "Studies in vivo with primates are needed. A protocol similar
to the one planned for human application should be carried out in primates, not just mice, because
the endogenous proviral sequences in primate, including human, DNA are different from those in mouse
DNA." 226 SCIENCE 401, 407 (1984).
The initial points to consider posed the following question: "2.a (1)(e) Has a protocol similar
to the one proposed for a clinical trial been carried out in non-human primates and with what results?
Specifically, is there any evidence that the retroviral vector has recombined with any endogenous or
other viral sequences in the animals." 50 Fed. Reg. 2943 (1985).
The revised version provides: 2.e.(I)(e) Has a protocol similar to the one proposed for a clinical
trial been carried out in non-human primates and/or other animals? What were the results? (emphasis
added). 50 Fed. Reg. 33,465 (1985). The document thus has moved to a more neutral position on the
issue of primate testing.
" "Somatic cells" are cells of the body other than germ-line cells which are the sex cells, i.e.
sperm and egg cells.
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the possibility of developing techniques for altering germ line cells at some point
in the future. That technological ability, once it exists, means that humans will
have the capacity to alter their own genetic future-the power to remake man in
his own image.
Second, single gene therapy inevitably takes us closer to the possibility of being
able to alter human traits that are shaped by more than one gene. Treating severe
combined immunodeficiency disease is one thing, but it would be quite another
for parents to be able to choose the IQ or appearance of their unborn child. The
distinction has been described by Dr. French Anderson as the difference between
gene therapy and eugenic genetic engineering. 9
B. Assessing the Risks
Bruce Mazlisch, in The Fourth Discontinuity,"0 built on Freud's notion of the
great thinkers of the past who "had outraged man's naive self-love." First in the
line was Copernicus, who taught that the earth was not the center of the universe.
Second was Darwin, who "robbed man of his peculiar privilege of having been
specially created, and relegated him to a descent from the animal world." Freud
placed himself third for endeavoring to prove that we are not master of our own
house, but influenced by unconscious motivations. American psychologist Jerome
Brunner later revised Freud's list to emphasize elimination of discontinuities; that
is, the establishment of a belief in a continuum of nature. According to Brunner,
the Greek physicist-philosophers of the sixth century B.C., rather than Copernicus,
established the first continuity for they conceived of the common laws of matter.
Darwin was second for creating the continuity between man and the animal kingdom,
and Freud third for the "continuity of organic lawfulness." This view is that ac-
cidents in human affairs can be seen as the continuity of the primitive, infantile,
and archaic with the civilized and evolved. Mazlisch argued that computers would
eliminate the fourth discontinuity, between man and machine. Perhaps. But surely
a major discontinuity is our sense of ourselves as having qualities that are not sub-
ject to human manipulation. Genetic engineering opens the possibility that qualities
we have considered personal, if not unique-intelligence, beauty, physical stamina-
may in the future be for sale on the open market.
There is a strong consensus that somatic cell therapy is not different from many
other types of medical intervention (organ transplants, bone marrow injections,
etc.).' There is a danger, however, that this consensus will push us unwittingly
down a slippery slope to germ line cell therapy or even to eugenic genetic engineer-
ing. In vitro fertilization, which has spread rapidly in the last several years, is only
'9 Anderson, supra note 31, at 23.
60 Mazlisch, The Fourth Discontinuity, TECH. & CULTURE, (Jan. 1967), at 1.
See, e.g., CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HUMAN GENE
THERAPY-A BACKGROUND PAPER (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 33,464 (1985).
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the most recent in a long list of technologies that have altered our world without
much public oversight.6" Although the possibility of moving closer to germ line
or even eugenic genetic engineering should not by itself stop any somatic cell therapy,
it does impose an obligation on all of us, I believe, to be aware of the risks of
future abuse. We must also use the time we have now to determine the appropriate
steps to take to control the risks that we will face once we have the technological
capacity to perform germ-line or enhancement genetic engineering.
V. WHo SHOULD REGULATE?
Because so many important societal values must be weighed in deciding which,
if any, of the first protocols for human gene therapy should be approved, it is
obviously important to look closely at who will make the decision to approve or
disapprove the protocols. In the United States, for the moment, at least three, and
possibly four different committees are required to approve any protocol for human
gene therapy performed with any public funds.
First, approval is needed from the IRB of the institution where the research
will be conducted. Second, approval is needed from the Institutional Biosafety Com-
mittee (IBC), which is essentially a local RAC mandated by the rDNA guidelines."
Third, the RAC itself must approve the protocol.
Recognizing that it was not constituted with clinical studies in mind, the RAC
in 1984 created a "Working Group on Human Gene Therapy," consisting of fif-
teen people, to advise it on these issues. 6' The Working Group includes four physi-
cians, two microbiologists, three lawyers, three ethicists, two public policy experts,
and one public member.6 5 Four of the fifteen are also members of the RAC itself.
Any human gene therapy protocol will now have to be reviewed by this fourth
group as well. While the approval of the Working Group is not required as a matter
of law, in practice it is unlikely that a rejection by it would be overturned by the
full RAC.
Although the RAC should be commended for reaching out to broaden the base
of available expertise in establishing the Working Group, unfortunately, the members
of the Working Group were chosen without public consultation. Consequently, the
RAC and the Working Group should proceed only after consulting as widely as
possible with interested experts and lay groups alike.
For the moment, the Working Group has restricted itself to preparing for the
arrival of the first protocols by issuing a set of "guidelines" to researchers. The
guidelines outline information that the Working Group anticipates it will need to
61 And this spread has occurred despite a ban on federal funding.
61 See supra note 22.
6' 44 Fed. Reg. 17,844 (1984).
"' 50 Fed. Reg. 2940 (1985).
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make a recommendation to the RAC on whether to approve a particular protocol.66
Although much of the information identified is needed anyway for the reviews by
the local IRB and IBC, some requirements are new.
Researchers are directed, for example, to report any serious adverse effects
directly to NIH. This requirement reflects the federal involvement any such experi-
ment will acquire by virtue of the approval process described above. 7 A second
new requirement is that researchers report what steps will be taken to protect the
privacy of any patients and families involved in the gene therapy. 8 Protection of
privacy has become a major concern in light of the enormous public attention paid
to the patients and families in recent cases involving new therapies, such as the
transplant of a baboon heart to Baby Fae and the artificial heart transplants.69
Significantly, even this modest step in the direction of broadening the base
of decision-makers on human gene therapy was almost killed by bureaucratic
infighting this past summer. NIH was about to publish a revised version of the
initial points, which had been prepared by the Working Group, when NIH Director
James B. Wyngaarden was asked by the Commissioner of FDA, Frank Young,
to delay publication of the revised document until a Biotechnology Science Board
(BSB) comes into existence.7"
The BSB was the product of the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and
the Environment Working Group on Biotechnology. 7' The Council consists of
representatives of the Departments of Interior, State, Justice, Agriculture, Com-
merce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Labor, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Council of Economic
Advisors, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Policy Develop-
ment, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Science Foun-
dation." Formed in April of 1984, the Council is reviewing federal regulatory rules
and procedures relating to biotechnology, including the RAC. 3
The BSB was proposed December 31, 1984. It appears to have been designed
primarily as a way to resolve conflicts among the five agencies in the federal govern-
ment that have jurisdiction over some aspects of genetic engineering: EPA, FDA,
the Department of Agriculture (USDA), NIH, and the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF). 4 As envisioned by the Council, each of the five agencies would form
66 50 Fed. Reg. 2940 (1985) (revised 50 Fed. Reg. 33,464 (1985)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
" See, e.g., Altman, Learning from Baby Fae, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Russell,
Heart Implant Problems Stir Doubts, Wash. Post, June 7, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
70 Culliton, New Biotech Review Board Planned, 229 SCIENcE 736 (1985).
" 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984).
2 See Talbot, supra note 23, at 41.
Id.
49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984).
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a "scientific advisory committee" that would be composed "principally of members
of the scientific community who possess demonstrated, recognized expertises [sic]
in disciplines related to biotechnology.""7 The five committees would in turn report
to the BSB, which would be chartered under the Department of Heath and Human
Services and would report to the Assistant Secretary for Health.
7 1
The initial proposal indicated that ten of the members of the BSB would be
members of one of the five advisory committees." Presumably, each would be a
scientist. Yet the proposal, in addition to listing an number of scientific review
tasks, identified one function of the BSB as "provid[ing] a forum for public con-
cerns."7 8 It appears it would have been a forum with few, if any, members from
outside the scientific community.
By November, 1985, the White House retreated from its original proposal. There
will be a coordinating panel called the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Com-
mittee (BSCC), but it will be a "consensus" body without authority to overturn
the actions of constitutent agencies.7 9
For the time being, approval has been given to the Working Group of the RAC
to proceed. The revised points to consider were published in the Federal Register
on August 19, 1985.80 But the internal fight over the composition of the reviewing
bodies is clearly not over. In its September 13, 1985 submission of comments on
the proposed points to consider, the FDA commented:
Since ... most of the critical decisions on individual investigators' submis-
sions are likely to be scientific and medical ones, we suggest reconsideration of
the membership of the RAC Working Group on Human Gene Therapy ... which
currently includes a large proportion of attorneys, ethicists, and public policy
specialists. Arguably, the Working Group should be supplemented with more
members with expertise in molecular biology, pharmacology, medicinal chemistry,
and medicine."
" 49 Fed. Reg. 50,905 (1984).
76 Id.
77 Id.
7, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,904 (1984).
P. Hilts, Panel Created to Coordinate Biotechnology, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1985, at A 6 col.
1. Reportedly, the change was prompted by industry pressure. Id.
" 50 Fed. Reg. 33,464 (1985).
" Letter to Dr. William Gartland, Director, Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, NIAID,
NIH, Bethesda, Md. 20205 (Sept. 13, 1985).
It is interesting to compare the criticism of the composition of the working group submitted by
Jeremy Rifkin and the Foundation on Economic Trends:
A given proposal may raise value-laden social and ethical issues that require more than
the application of technical or scientific disciplines by the working group as well as by those
groups that propose specific studies. There may be need for qualified representatives of the
social sciences, including theologians, ethicists, social philosophers, anthropologists, and
economists, as well as micro-biologists and various medical experts as voting members of
the working group. The existence of only one or two representatives of such other disciplines
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
It will not be easy to decide what limits, if any, to place on the development
of human gene therapy. At a minimum, we must remain vigilant about the dangers
of false cures. The temptation to help the victims of SCID or even of Lesch-Nyhan
disease, which currently has no available cure, is understandably strong. But surely
it should not lead to premature efforts that are scientifically unsupportable. Con-
sider the cautionary language of United States v. Rutherford,82 in which the Supreme
Court confronted the claim that the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act should not
be applied to terminally ill patients who wished to try Laetrile:
To accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy standards of the act
have no relevance for terminal patients is to deny the Commissioner's authority
over all drugs, however toxic or ineffectual, for such individuals. If history is any
guide, this new market would not be long overlooked. Since the turn of the cen-
tury, resourceful entrepreneurs have advertised a wide variety of reportedly simple
and painless cures for cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard oil, eggs
and ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of colored floodlamps, pastes made from
glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral tablets; and "Fountain of Youth" mixtures
of spices, oil and suet .... [T]his historical experience does suggest why Congress
could reasonably have determined to protect the terminally ill, not less than other
patients, from the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise.83
The reaction of the scientific community to the one known abuse of the rele-
vant guidelines is encouraging. In 1980, Dr. Martin Cline, Chief of Hematology
and Oncology at UCLA, attempted gene therapy on two patients suffering from
a hereditary blood disorder. NIH found that Cline had violated both scientific and
ethical research standards for human subjects. His own research data revealed little
scientific basis to believe his effort would succeed."' Worse, he failed to disclose
to the IRB or to the patients that they would receive recombinant DNA material
despite the fact that the IRB went to considerable length to verify that the pro-
cedure would not involve recombinant DNA. Ultimately, his resignation as Chief
of Hematology and Oncology was accepted; NIH withdrew his current grants and
required a report of this matter to accompany grant applications for the next five
years. 5
As the Cline affair suggests, we should also guard against what Judge David
Bazelon has termed the "republic of science." 86 The idea of nonscientists having
may not be sufficient to assure that the group will recognize the potential issues or resolve
them satisfactorily.
Letter from Edward Lee Rodgers, Counsel for Foundation of Economic Trends and Jeremy Rifkin
to Director, Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, NIH (Sept. 18, 1985).
'2 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
88 Id. at 557-58.
4 Williamson, Gene Therapy, 298 NATURE 416, 418 (1982).
'8 PRESIDENT'S COMISSION, Protecting Human Subjects, (Appendix E) 177, 182-85 (1981).
16 Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977).
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anything to do with science is a relatively recent one. Scientists have at times likened
their profession to an autonomous, self-governing republic. To qualify for citizen-
ship, one's scientific credentials must be in order. Only scientists, according to this
view, should have a voice in the way science is governed. But these are not the
principles on which a democratic society rests. Tracy Sonnenborn, speaking at the
first conference on Genetic Intervention in Man in 1965, posed the issue this way:
The human problems raised by these new possibilities ... are problems of morals,
ethics, religion and politics. They are problems of how knowledge and the power
that knowledge confers can be used. They could be used for good or ill, for the
enslavement or the liberation of man. How they will be used obviously will not
be decided by scientists alone. Nor should this be decided alone by professional
politicians or theologians or by philosophers or by moralists. It should be decided
on an enlightened and broadly based public opinion."
To a large extent, money has altered the tradition. Since World War II, the
federal government in this country has largely paid for broad areas of scientific
research, including the Manhattan project, the space program, and biomedical
research in general. With the influx of so many government dollars, some govern-
ment supervision became inevitable. But as the spread of in vitro fertilization
demonstrates, denial of federal support is not always an effective sanction, at least
in the late stages of the development of a new technology.
The difficulties of designing effective public controls should not obscure the
need for such controls. Just as we have learned not to leave war solely to the generals,
scientists alone should not control human gene therapy. It no doubt will be dif-
ficult to achieve appropriate control of gene therapy, or of any technology of com-
parable power for that matter, as the continuing debate on nuclear weapons suggests.
The last analogy may be particularly apt, it turns out, for both nuclear weapons
and gene therapy raise at least the possibility of ending the human race as we know
it." That potential, in turn, underscores the need to establish suitable public controls.
The Working Group on Human Gene Therapy and the RAC are a good first
effort. At least as long as they consult a broad group of both scientific and lay
advisors, they are likely to be good bodies for reviewing the risks and benefits of
" IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS/BIOTECHNOLOGY, II PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CON-
VOCATION OF ENGINEERING ACADEMICS, IV-A RAPPAPORT 224, May 29 - June 1, 1983 (quoted in Hear-
ing on Biotechnology Regulation of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 11, 1984 (statement by Frank E.
Young, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration)).
11 In 1974 in explaining why a moratorium had been proposed on DNA research, Nobel laureate
David Baltimore commented:
[A]lthough our dilemma ... may differ from that of the atomic scientists in many details
.... we all grew up with a question of the correctness of using the atomic bomb as one
of the great moral dilemmas of the second part of the twentieth century .... I think you
can see . . . a direct line of thinking.
Risks and Benefits, supra note 13, at 1024.
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particular research protocols involving somatic cell gene therapy. Assessment of
the risks of germ cell therapy, or of enhancement genetic engineering, by contrast,
is beyond the present charge or resources of the Working Group.
Legislation that establishes a permanent advisory body charged with reviewing
longer term risks has now been passed by the Congress over a veto by President
Reagan.8 9 The new law establishes a Biomedical Ethics Board modeled on the Office
of Technology Assessment. The Board is to have twelve members, six from the
Senate and six from the House. The Board is directed to:
study and report to the Congress on a continuing basis on the ethical issues arising
from the delivery of health care and biomedical and behavioral research, including
the protection of human subjects of such research and developments in genetic
engineering (including activities in recombinant DNA technology) which have
implications for human genetic engineering.
To conduct the studies and to make the reports, the Board is to appoint a
Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee of fourteen members: four distinguished
in biomedical or behavioral research, three distinguished in medicine or the provi-
sion of health care, five distinguished in ethics, theology, law, the natural sciences,
the social sciences, health administration, government, and/or public affairs, and
two citizens with an interest in biomedical ethics. Each member is to serve for a
term of four years, with the terms staggered to establish continuity in membership.
The structure of a Board plus a Committee holds out much promise. The
members of the Board are to represent both parties in equal numbers, and thus
should provide more consistent political direction than if it were yet another Presiden-
tial commission. The Committee, in turn, will be able to draw upon the experience
of two previous Presidential commissions9" as well as the RAC using scientific
and ethical experts and lay members to tackle in a public forum both ethical
and policy problems posed by new technologies. Congress may at last have found
a structure that brings to bear the expertise of the relevant scientific communities
in an open, democratic setting with the resources to tackle the enormous ethical
and political problems posed for our society by future developments in genetic
engineering. Now it should also find the funds to bring the Board to life.
S9 The Health Research Extension Act, H.R. 2409, Cong. Rec. 515925 (Nov. 20, 2985).
1 The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research was established in 1974 by Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 352. The President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established
in 1978 by Pub. L. 95-622, later amended by Pub. L. 97-377 (1982).
The National Commission was composed of eleven members appointed for the life of the com-
mission by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
The President's Commission was also made up of eleven members. They were presidential appointees
appointed for two, three, or four years, and thus the membership could, and in fact, did change over
time to reflect the change from Carter to Reagan.
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